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THE CHILD LABOR ACT AND THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT OF ILLINOIS
What is the employer's liability for injuries to
illegally employed minors? Is such liability covered
by the standard Workmen's Compensation and
Employer's Liability insurance policy?
GEORGE W. ANGERSTEIN
T HERE are numerous reasons why this subject is one of
increasing importance to employers, insurance com-
panies, minors, their parents and the public generally. Some
of these reasons are the national urgency for increased pro-
duction, the very natural desire of all Americans, including
minors under the age of sixteen years, to assist in the national
aim -of greater production to the extent of their ability, the
need in some instances due to higher living costs that such
minors engage in some gainful occupation so as to supple-
ment the family income, a growing labor shortage, the over-
taxed facilities of plant employment offices-all these and
many other factors make inevitable the occurrence of viola-
tions of the Child Labor Law irrespective of the best and most
careful of intentions.
Upon the happening of an injury to the illegally em-
ployed minor a number of perplexing questions arise, and
while the necessary limits of this article do not permit an
exhaustive review of all the various questions which confront
employers and insurance companies, nor of all decisions
dealing with such of the many problems as have been before
the courts, nevertheless an attempt is made to call attention
to some of the difficulties to be encountered and to certain
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anomalies in the present laws which will require legislative
action to clarify.
HISTORY OF CHILD LABOR LAW
The first law enacted in Illinois forbidding certain em-
ployment of children was enacted in 18771 as an added sec-
tion to the Criminal Code of 1874.2 The first Child Labor
Law separate and distinct from the provisions of the Crimi-
nal Code was enacted in 1891.1 This first Child Labor Law
was very meager, consisting of five short sections and was
followed by the law of 1897.1 This Act contained nine sec-
tions, exclusive of one providing that all acts or parts of
acts inconsistent therewith were thereby repealed, and regu-
lated the employment of minors much more fully and com-
pletely than did the Act of 1891.
The Act of 1897 was followed by the Act of 1903, 5 which
contained fourteen sections, exclusive of the section express-
ly repealing the Act of 1891. The next legislation on this sub-
ject was the Act of 1917.8 This was followed by the Act of
1921, 7 which as subsequently amended, is the present Child
Labor Law of Illinois.
It is quite noticeable that as Illinois has expanded indus-
trially and as its population has increased, the State's con-
' An Act to prevent and punish wrongs to children approved May 17, 1877; in
force July 1, 1877. Laws 1877, p. 90. See Morris v. Stanfield, 81 Ill. App. 264
(1899), based on this early law and holding that every day's employment of
minor under thirteen years of age who was injured on employer's revolving saw
was a separate offense and also that "the purpose of this statute is clearly to
prevent employment of children."
2 An Act to revise the law in relation to criminal jurisprudence, approved
March 27, 1874; in force July 1, 1874. Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 348.
3 An Act to prevent Child Labor, approved June 17, 1891; in force July 1, 1891.
4 An Act to regulate the employment of children in the State of Illinois and to
provide for the enforcement thereof, approved June 9, 1897; in force July 1, 1897.
5 An Act to regulate the employment of children in the State of Illinois, and
to provide for the enforcement thereof, approved May 15, 1903; in force July 1,
1903.
6 An Act concerning child labor and to repeal an Act entitled "An Act to
regulate the employment of children in the State of Illinois, and to provide for
the enforcement thereof, approved May 15, 1903, in force July 1, 1903," approved
June 26, 1917; in force July 1, 1917.
7 An Act to amend An Act Concerning Child Labor and to repeal An Act
entitled "An Act to regulate the employment of children in the State of Illinois,
and to provide for the enforcement thereof, approved May 15, 1903, in force July
1, 1903," approved June 26, 1917; in force July 1, 1917.
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cern for the welfare of its children has been increasingly
alert and vigilant. In passing it may be stated that the con-
stitutionality of the Illinois Child Labor Laws has been up-
held on the ground that the State is vitally interested in the
protection of the lives, persons, health, and morals of its
future citizens and that the enactment of such laws for the
protection of children is a proper exercise of the State's
police powers. 8
The Child Labor Law of Illinois makes provision for the
imposition of penalties for violation of any of its provisions.
It does not expressly declare that an employer who violates
the act by employing a minor without complying with its
terms shall be liable to an action for damages which the
minor so employed may suffer by reason of his employment,
nevertheless the Supreme Court of Illinois has held in nu-
merous cases that the employer is so liable.'
Contributory negligence on the part of the illegally em-
ployed minor is no defense to the employer as the action is
for the breach of a statutory duty and is not based upon
negligence, and the rules in regard to negligence, contribu-
tory negligence, negligence of a fellow servant and assumed
risk do not apply. 10 Failure to require the production by the
minor of an age and school certificate renders the employer
liable in case the minor is injured because it is reasoned that
if the employer had not employed the minor in violation of
the statute he would not have received the injury complained
8 Kowalczyk v. Swift & Co., 329 Ill. 308, 160 N.E. 588 (1928); Rost v. F. H.
Noble & Co., 316 Ill. 357, 147 N.E. 258 (1925); Gill v. Boston Store of Chicago,
337 IM. 70, 168 N.E. 895 (1929); Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S.
320, 34 S.Ct. 60, 58 L.Ed. 245 (1913); affirming 250 Ill. 303, 95 N.E. 204 (1913).
9 American Car Co. v. Armentraut, 214 Ill. 509, '73 N.E. 766 (1905); Strafford
v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 238 Ill. 371, 87 N.E. 358 (1909); Rost v. Noble & Co.,
316 IM. 357, 147 N.E. 258 (1925); Newton v. Illinois Oil Co., 316 Ill. 416, 147 N.E.
465 (1925); Kowalczyk v. Swift & Co., 329 Ill. 308, 160 N.E. 588 (1928). This has
long been the rule of law in Illinois. In an early case, Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v.
Voelker, 129 Ill. 540, 555, 22 N.E. 20, 24 (1889), it was stated, "A statute com-
manding an act to be done, creates an absolute duty to perform such act, and
the duty of performance does not depend upon and is not controlled by surround-
ing circumstances. Nonperformance of such statutory duty, resulting in injury
to another, may therefore be pronounced to be negligence as a conclusion of
law."
10 Frorer v. Baker, 137 Ill. App. 588 (1907); American Car Co. v. Armentraut,
214 IMI. 509, 73 N.E. 766 (1905); Rost v. Noble & Co., 316 Ill. 357, 147 N.E. 258
(1925): Gill v. Boston Store of Chicago, 337 Ill 70, 168 N.E. 895 (1929).
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of, and his unlawful employment, therefore, may be regard-
ed as the proximate cause of his injury."
Likewise, if the minor is illegally employed it makes no
difference as regards the liability of the employer whether or
not the minor furnished an age and school certificate or
whether the machinery was or was not in good repair and
properly inspected. 2
It also has been held no defense to the employer that the
illegally employed minor was injured by leaving the work
he was employed and directed to do and engaging in work he
was forbidden to perform. The employer is held bound to
know that on account of the minor's tender years he is not
capable of a proper appreciation of danger, and also that
on account of his immaturity he is incapable of a proper
comprehension of the necessity for obedience to orders, and
the employer has the burden of protecting him against his
own negligence while working for the employer.13
Even though the minor under sixteen years of age has
advanced physical qualifications and gives every appear-
ance of being more than sixteen years of age and represents
himself so to be, it is no defense to the employer as the cause
of action is for the violation of a statute, and the prohibition
of employment of all children under sixteen years in the ab-
sence of a certificate of employment, is absolute, and all
other evidence is immaterial. 4
False statements by the minor as to his age or any mis-
representations in regard thereto do not estop the minor from
maintaining his action, as it is held that a child under the
prohibited age cannot by a false statement as to his age
11 Frorer v. Baker, 137 IM. App. 588 (1907). "The inhibition against the employ-
ment of children under sixteen and over fourteen years of age, unless there is
first produced and placed on file the required age and school certificate, is just
as imperative as the inhibition against the employment of children under sixteen
years of age at work which may be considered dangerous to their lives and
limbs. It is the employment under the circumstances specified that is pro-
hibited by the statute and made unlawful. If the appellant corporation had not
employed appellee in violation of the statute, appellee would not have received
the injury complained of, and his unlawful employment, therefore, may not
improperly be regarded, prima facie at least, as the proximate cause of his
injury."
12 Kowalczyk v. Swift & Co., 329 Il. 308, 160 N.E. 588 (1928).
1a Strafford v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 238 Ila. 371. 87 N.E. 358 (1909).
14 Gill v. Boston Store of Chicago, 337 Ill. 70, 168 N.E. 895 (1929).
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make his employment in violation of the statute lawful and
authorize the employer to do that which the statute in ex-
press terms says he shall not do. To so hold would be to hold
that a child by his false statement, could, in effect, repeal
the statute. 5
Some of the cases herein previously referred to were
decided prior to the enactment of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act of Illinois, and all of them were decided prior to
the 1927 amendment to Sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Compensa-
tion Act. Prior to 1927 the second paragraph of Section 5 of
the Compensation Act, in defining the term "employee" con-
tained the words "who are legally permitted to work under
the laws of this state" immediately following and qualifying
the word, "minors."
The decisions in illegal employment of minor cases prior
to 1927 and while such above quoted words remained in the
Workmen's Compensation Act are interesting, and refer-
ence to them is necessary, as will later appear, for proper
understanding of the present, and as yet unsolved, difficul-
ties presented by the two laws.
CASES PRIOR TO 1927 AMENDMENT OF THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
In an early case, decided while the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act was still elective and not compulsory, the
lower court sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it had no jurisdiction as the
minor's remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. The Appellate Court reversed the lower court and re-
manded the case on the ground that while minors might be
considered as having adopted the provisions of the Work-
men's Compensation Act concerning work they were legally
15 Beauchamp v. Sturges & Burn Co., 250 Ill. 303, 95 N.E. 204 (1913); American
Car Co. v. Armentraut, 214 Ill. 509, 73 N.E. 766 (1905). It was held in Swift &
Co. v. Rennard, 119 Ill. App. 173 (1905), that "The fact . . . that appellee [the
minor] knew he was under the age of sixteen years, and concealed that fact from
appellant [the employer], or that he falsely stated his age to appellant, would
not relieve appellant from the duty to know nor the responsibility of not knowing
that he was of legal age before employing him and exposing him to the perils
absolutely prohibited by the statute enacted solely for the protection of children,
thus legislatively declared to be incapable of protecting themselves."
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permitted to perform they " . . cannot be considered as
having adopted it for the purpose of performing work which
is prohibited by law; and, therefore, compensation for in-
juries which they receive while engaged in the unlawful work
cannot be recovered under the provisions of such act."' 6
Another early case held that an illegally employed minor
might bring an action at law for damages even though
the employer was operating under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, the minor " . . . not being an employee legally
permitted to work under Section 5 of the latter act.' 17
It also was held that the Industrial Commission could
not award compensation to an illegally employed minor for
the reason that "the Workmen's Compensation Act does not
apply to minors who are illegally employed."'
Prior to the 1927 amendment to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act striking out the words "who are legally per-
mitted to work under the laws of the State," which immedi-
ately followed and qualified the word "minor" in the second
paragraph of Section 5, it was consistently held by both the
Appellate and Supreme Courts of Illinois that the Industrial
Commission did not possess jurisdiction to award com-
pensation for injuries to illegally employed minors. In fact,
it was held in one case that even though the Commission
made an award which was paid by the employer, the minor
was not thereby later estopped to proceed against the em-
ployer in a common law suit for damages. The reasons as-
signed by the court for its decision were that the Workmen's
Compensation Act applied only where the contract of hiring
was a valid contract and that "It cannot be supposed that
the legislature intended to make such contracts illegal, [by
enactment of the Child Labor Act] and at the same time to
give them all the force and effect of legal contracts, so far
as civil liability for injuries to minors are concerned. To so
hold would tend to encourage and not discourage the prac-
tice which the statute has declared illegal; for, in the event
16 Lostutter v. Brown Shoe Co., 203 Ill. App. 517 (1916).
17 Zurasky v. Handycap Company, 210 Ill. App. 254 (1918).
18 Messmer v. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 562, 118 N.E. 993 (1918); Roszek v.
Bauerle & Stark Co., 282 Ill. 557, 118 N.E. 991 (1918); Moll v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 288 Iii. 347, 123 N.E. 562 (1919).
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of an injury, the employer would suffer no more in the case
of an illegal than of a legal employment," and therefore,
the court held that although the Industrial Commission clear-
ly was without jurisdiction to make the award, nevertheless,
the minor who had secured an award was not estopped from
maintaining his common law action for damages."
Although the courts of Illinois consistently held prior to
the 1927 amendment to Section 5 of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act that the Industrial Commission did not possess
jurisdiction to award compensation for injuries sustained by
illegally employed minors, it was held that the Commission
possessed jurisdiction to award compensation to a twelve-
year-old caddy for injuries sustained on the premises of a
golf club. The basis of the decision on the point of employ-
ment was that the work of the caddy was not in violation of
the Child Labor Act. This case merely added emphasis to
the courts' holdings that while the Industrial Commission
had jurisdiction to award compensation for injuries to
minors legally employed, it very definitely did not possess
jurisdiction to award compensation for injuries sustained
by a minor illegally employed. 20
At that point, at a time when the rights and liabilities
of all parties were considered definitely established and set-
tled, the legislature enacted the 1927 amendment to the Work-
men's Compensation Act striking out of Section 5 (second
paragraph) the words "who are legally permitted to work
under the laws of this state" which immediately followed
and qualified the word "minors." At the same time, 1927,
the legislature amended Section 8 by adding a new para-
graph, Paragraph (k), which added paragraph remains un-
changed today and which increased fifty per centum the com-
pensation payable under paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e) and
(f) of Section 8, for injuries sustained by illegally employed
minors, and the new paragraph (k) also contained a provi-
sion that it should not be construed to repeal or amend the
provisions of the Child Labor Act.
In addition to this added paragraph (k) increasing by
19 McInness v. Wilson Printing Co., 258 Ill. App. 161 (1930).
20 Indian Hill Club v. Industrial Commission, 309 IMI. 271, 140 N.E. 871 (1923).
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fifty per centum the compensation payable for temporary,
partial permanent, total permanent, specific disability and
also for disfigurement, the legislature at the same time
amended Section 7 by adding paragraph (i) providing for
a fifty per centum increase of compensation payable as death
benefits under paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of Sec-
tion 7 in cases where the deceased employee was under six-
teen years of age at the time of the accident and was illegal-
ly employed.
Since the enactment of these 1927 amendments to Sec-
tions 5, 7 and 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, only
one case has arisen involving their interpretation and appli-
cation and for this and other reasons the case is of consider-
able interest and importance.
The plaintiff, an illegally employed minor, started a com-
mon law action for personal injuries and the defendant de-
murred to plaintiff's declaration. Plaintiff elected to stand
by his declaration and upon judgment being entered for de-
fendant, plaintiff appealed direct to the Supreme Court be-
cause the constitutionality of the amendments to Sections 5
and 8 was involved.
The court held that the public policy of a state when not
fixed by the constitution was not unalterable and that para-
graph (k) of Section 8 was a valid enactment which did not
purport to repeal, and in fact did not repeal, the Child Labor
Act or any part thereof, but on the contrary expressly stated
an intention not to do so.
The court stated (p. 583):
The Child Labor law is wholly a penal law and is in nowise affected by
the enactment of paragraph (k). The only effect that paragraph has with
reference thereto is to transfer a remedy of a minor not given by the
Child Labor law but accruing to a minor by reason of a violation thereof,
from a suit in trespass for personal injuries to a claim for such injuries
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. There is no vested right of one
injured to any particular remedy, and a transfer of remedies is clearly
within the scope of legislative enactment.
As to the contention that paragraph (k) of Section 8 was
in conflict with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act for the reason that the term "employee" is restricted to
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persons in the service of another under contracts of hire, ex-
press or implied, and that by paragraph (k) the term "em-
ployee" is applied to one under sixteen years of age who is
illegally employed at the time of the injury, and that there-
fore in cases arising under paragraph (k), there could be no
contract of hire, the court held that while a contract of hir-
ing a minor in violation of the Child Labor law was an illegal
contract, such contract was not absolutely void in all its as-
pects; that it had sufficient virility to fix the relation between
plaintiff and defendant as that of master and servant. The
court then concluded that the illegally employed minor's
remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act and not
by a suit at law and that the demurrer to the plaintiff's dec-
laration had been properly sustained.2
The amendments of 1927 to the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, as interpreted and construed by the court in the
Landry v. Shinner case, marked a complete change in the
public policy of the State as regards the rights of illegally
employed minors for personal injuries. It previously had
been consistently held that such injuries were beyond the
scope of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act;
that the Industrial Commission was without jurisdiction to
award compensation for such injuries and therefore that the
illegally employed minor's sole right was a common law ac-
tion based upon a violation of the provisions of the Child La-
bor Act. After the 1927 amendments the situation was exact-
ly reversed-the minor's sole right was under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and he no longer could maintain a com-
mon law action.
As the court had stated in the Landry v. Shinner case,
the only effect of paragraph (k) of Section 8 was to transfer
a remedy from a suit in trespass for personal injuries to a
claim for such injuries under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, and that since there is no vested rights in any particular
remedy, the transfer was clearly within the power of the leg-
islature. With this interpretation and application of the new
amendments the situation was satisfactorily clarified and
the rights of the parties definitely established.
21 Landry v. E. G. Shinner & Co., Inc., 344 Ill. 579, 176 N.E. 895 (1931).
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THE 1931 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 6
Unfortunately, real, and thus far, lasting confusion was
created by the 1931 amendment to Section 6 of the Work-
men's Compensation Act.22 This amendment purports to give
the illegally employed minor a choice of two remedies. He
is permitted to proceed under the Compensation Act or he or
his legal representative may file a rejection of his rights to
the benefits under the Act and pursue his common law or
statutory remedies for damages. It also should be noted that
this amendment, in case of the minor's death, apparently
would give the right to his beneficiaries either to collect com-
pensation benefits as provided by the Act plus fifty percent
additional, 2 or if such beneficiaries wished they could reject
such benefits and sue for wrongful death.
WOULD THE MINOR HAVE TO REJECT WITHIN SIX MONTHS?
Although the 1931 amendment to Section 6 of the Work-
men's Compensation Act requires the illegally employed
minor to file with the Industrial Commission a rejection of
his right to the benefits under the Act within six months after
the time of the injury if he wishes to pursue his common law
remedy for damages, the question arises, Would the courts
22 Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Illinois (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1941, Ch. 48, § 143) is as follows, the 1931 amendment being the italicized portion:
"No common law or statutory right to recover damages for injury or death
sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such em-
ployee, other than the compensation herein provided, shall be available to any
employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or
partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one
otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury; provided, however, that
in any action now pending or hereafter begun to enforce a common law or
statutory right to recover damages for negligently causing the injury or death
of any employee it shall not be necessary to allege in the declaration that either
the employee or the employer or both were not governed by the provisions of this
Act or of any similar act in force in this or any other state: Provided, further,
that any illegally employed minor or his legal representatives shall, except as
hereinafter provided, have the right, within six months after the time of injury or
death, to file with the commission a rejection of his right to the beneftts under this
Act, in which case such illegally employed minor or his legal representatives shall
have the right to pursue his or their common law or statutory remedies to recover
damages for such injury or death; and provided, further, that no payment of com-
pensation under this Act shall be made to an illegally employed minor, or his legal
representatives, unless such payment has first been approved by the commia#i.o
or any member thereof, and if such payment has been so approved such payment
shall be a bar to a subsequent rejection of the provision of this Act."
23 Paragraph (i) of Section 7 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, I1. Rev.
Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 144(i).
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hold such six months' limitation binding upon the minor?
In Walgreen Company v. Indiana Company,24 no claim
was made on behalf of a minor until four years after the in-
jury. The claim was based on the provisions of paragraph
(h) of Section 8 of the 1919 Workmen's Compensation Act. 25
Section 24 at that time also provided that in cases of mental
incapacity of the employee, notice had to be given within six
months after the accident. In other words, the provisions of
paragraph (h) of Section 8 of the 1919 Act provided for cases
of "incompetency" of an injured employee and Section 24
made a provision for "mental incapacity" of the employee.
The court affirmed an award for compensation entered
by the Industrial Commission and held that "the limitations
of time provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act do
not run against the rights of a minor so long as he is without
a guardian."
Since the decision in the Walgreen case (filed October
28, 1926), by amendments, effective July 1, 1927, the word
''mentally" was placed before the word "incompetent" in
paragraph (h) of Section 8, and the provisions now in Section
24 as to cases of mental incapacity were added.26
In view of the provisions of the Act prior to the decision
in the Walgreen case and the amendments subsequent there-
to, it would have seemed a reasonable construction that the
periods of limitation as then or later provided by the Act ran
against injured minor employees, unless they were also
mental incompetents for the reason that while a minor is
24 323 Ill. 194, 153 N.E. 831, 48 A.L.R. 1199 (1926).
25 Paragraph (h) of Section 8 of the 1919 Workmen's Compensation Act was
as follows: "In case an injured employee shall be incompetent at the time when
any right or privilege accrues to him under the provisions of this Act, a conserva-
tor or guardian may be appointed, pursuant to law, and may, on behalf of such
incompetent, claim and exercise any such right or privilege with the same force
and effect as if the employee himself had been competent and had claimed or
exercised said right or privilege; and no limitations of time by this Act provided
shall run so long as said incompetent employee is without a conservator or
guardian." [Italics supplied.]
26 Amendment (1927) to Section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as to
limitations in cases of mental incapacity is as follows:
. . . . In case of mental incapacity of the employee or any dependents of a
deceased employee who may be entitled to compensation under the provisions of
this Act, the limitations of time by this Act provided shall not begin to run
against said mental incompetents until a conservator or guardian has been ap-
pointed .. " Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 161.
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"incompetent" in a legal sense, yet he is not a "mental in-
competent" as the term is applied to lunatics, idiots, or in-
sane persons.
In a later case,27 a minor was permitted to make claim
and was awarded the unpaid balance of death benefits upon
the remarriage of his mother over three years after the death
of his father when the Industrial Commission had erroneous-
ly found that the mother was the sole dependent. The court
distinguished between minors who are employees and minors
who are dependents. However, the court stated that "it is the
public policy of this State that courts should guard carefully
the rights of minors and that a minor should not be precluded
from enforcing his rights unless clearly debarred by some
statute or constitutional provision," and cites the Walgreen
case with approval without mention of the 1927 amendments.
In a more recent case2" the Appellate Court in discussing
the provisions in Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act requiring the illegally employed minor, or his legal rep-
resentative, to file with the Industrial Commission a rejec-
tion of his right within six months after the time of the in-
jury or death, stated the minor "in order to be bound by its
provisions must have knowledge that he is subject to the pro-
visions that require him to file a rejection." If, of course, the
application of the six months' time provision of Section 6 de-
pended on whether or not the illegally employed minor had
knowledge of such provision, then for all practical purposes
the provision is of no significance whatever.
WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS AS REGARDS ILLEGALLY
EMPLOYED MINORS?
Under these conditions, what is the period of time within
which an illegally employed minor for whom no guardian
has been appointed can bring an action against the employer
before the Industrial Commission for compensation benefits
27 Waechter v. Industrial Commission, 367 IM. 256, 11 N.E. (2d) 378 (1937). For
other cases as to the application of limitations as to minors and also cited in the
Walgreen Co. case, see McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120
N.E. 476, 2 A.L.R. 1359 (1918); Maskaliunas v. Chicago & Western Indiana R.
Co., 318 Ill. 142, 149 N.E. 23 (1925).
28 Kijowski v. Times Publishing Corp., 298 l. App. 236, 18 N.E. (2d) 754
(1939), affirmed 372 I1. 311, 23 N.E. (2d) 703 (1939).
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under the Act for personal injuries? How long does he have
to start a common law suit for damages for such injuries?
Is such minor bound at all by the provision requiring him to
file a rejection with the Industrial Commission within six
months after the injury before he can pursue a common law
or statutory remedy?
The Supreme Court" has noted a distinction in that the
provision in the second paragraph of Section 5 that minors
"who, for the purpose of this Act, shall be considered the
same and have the same power to contract, receive pay-
ments and give quittances therefor as adult employees," ap-
plies only to minor employees, not to minor dependents. How-
ever, in the same case the court refers to the established
rule of law in Illinois, "that a minor cannot commence or en-
gage in a legal proceeding in his own name" and further that
it was the public policy of this state that courts should guard
carefully the rights of minors and that a minor should not be
precluded except in case of clear statutory prohibition.
The provision in the second paragraph of Section 5 that
minors shall have "power to contract, receive payments and
give quittances therefor" in no way meets the situation. It
is not a question of releasing a claim-it is a question of the
time in which a minor can make a claim.
There certainly are no clear statutory or constitutional
time limitations against such minor, and in their absence
and in view of the decisions of the courts, 0 it very probably
has to be assumed that, at least, until the appointment of a
guardian there is no limit of time except the termination of
the minor's infancy as regards, (1) his right to bring a claim
for benefits under the Compensation Act, (2) his right to file
a rejection with the Industrial Commission of his right to
benefits under the Act so as to proceed at common law, or
(3) his right to sue at common law for damages due to per-
sonal injury.
29 Waechter v. Industrial Commission, 367 IIl. 256, 11 N.E. (2d) 378 (1937).
30 In addition to the Illinois cases previously cited, see Decker v. Pouvailsmith
Corporation, 233 N.Y.S. 407 (1929).
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WHAT ABOUT THE INSURANCE CARRIER?
Thus far the only liability arising out of the illegal em-
ployment of a minor which has been considered has been
that of the employer.
What about the liability of the employer's workmen's
compensation carrier? This is really a multiple question.
First-Is the insurance carrier liable for any compensa-
tion whatever where the claimant is a minor illegally em-
ployed by the assured?
Second-If the insurance carrier is liable for compensa-
tion is it liable only for the regular compensation benefits
under the Act or is it liable for both the regular benefits and
the fifty per centum penalty provided for in paragraph (k)
of Section 8?
Third-Is the insurance carrier liable to indemnify the
employer against the expenses of trial and the amount of any
judgment which might be recovered by the illegally em-
ployed minor in a common law action against the employer
in a case where the minor previously had filed with the In-
dustrial Commission a rejection of his right to compensa-
tion?
Taking the first and second questions-Is the insurance
carrier liable for compensation for injuries to an illegally
employed minor and, if so, is it also liable for the fifty per
centum penalty as provided in paragraph (k) of Section 8-
reference must first be made to the provisions of paragraph
3 of Section 26 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, provid-
ing that if the method of guaranteeing compensation liability
is by insurance, the employer shall "Insure his entire liabili-
ty to pay such compensation in some insurance carrier au-
thorized, licensed or permitted to do such insurance business
in this state; all policies of such insurance carriers insuring
the payment of compensation under this Act shall cover all
the employees and the entire compensation liability of the
insured, and any provision in such policy, or in any endorse-
ment attached thereto, attempting to limit or modify in any
way, the liability of the insurance carriers issuing the same
shall be wholly void ... " [Italics supplied.]
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Next is considered paragraph One (a) of the standard
workmen's compensation and employer's liability policy. The
company does hereby agree "to pay promptly to any person
entitled thereto under the Workmen's Compensation Law
and in the manner therein provided, the entire amount of
any sum due .... It is agreed that all the provisions of each
Workmen's Compensation Law covered hereby shall be and
remain a part of this contract as fully and completely as if
written herein, so far as they apply to compensation or other
benefits for any personal injury or death covered by this
policy, while this policy shall remain in force. .. ."
While criticism thereof is not germane to the discussion,
the last quoted provision is surplusage and adds nothing to
the meaning or scope of the policy. "A basic rule of the con-
struction of contracts and a material part of every contract
is that all laws in existence when the contract is made nec-
essarily enter into and form a part of it as fully as if they
were expressly referred to or incorporated into its terms.
This principle embraces alike those which affect its validity,
construction, discharge and enforcement."'" "The pure con-
tractual rights arising out of an insurance policy are or-
dinarily determined by its provisions, but it is a basic rule
of construction that all general legal principles affecting
contracts enter by implication into and form a part of every
contract as fully as if specifically expressed therein. '"2
Therefore, clearly, even though the policy did not so express-
ly provide, all the provisions of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act are a part of the policy.
Referring now to the above quoted provisions of Para-
graph 3 of Section 26 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
31 Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n v. Collins, 341 IM. 548, 173 N.E. 465 (1930); Armour
Packing Co., v. United States, 153 F. 1, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 400 (1907); United States
v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 18 L.Ed. 403 (1867); Rees v. Watertown, 86 U.S. 107, 22
L.Ed. 72 (1874); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 24 L.Ed. 793 (1878); Siebert v.
United States, 122 U.S. 284, 7 S.Ct. 1190, 30 L.Ed. 1161 (1887). Contracts are
presumed to have been entered into in the light of existing principles of law.
Black & Yates, Inc. v. Negros-Philippine Lumber Co., 32 Wyo. 248, 231 P. 398
(1924). And the existing law is presumed to be a part of every contract. Farley
v. Board of Education, 62 Okla. 181, 162 P. 797 (1917). And contracts should be
so understood and construed unless otherwise clearly indicated by the terms of
the agreement. Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. (U.S.) 646, 11 L.Ed. 1141 (1848).
82 91 A.L.R. 1482, headnote 3, Insurance, § 169.
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("All policies . . . shall cover all the employees and the en-
tire compensation liability of the insured . . . ."), it seems
obvious that the first and second questions must be answered
in the affirmative, that is, the insurance carrier, under the
present standard form policy, is liable for compensation,
including the fifty per centum increase, for injuries sus-
tained by an illegally employed minor.
This would not be the conclusion if the policy exempted
from coverage of paragraph One (a) persons employed in
violation of law. The policy, however, nowhere makes such
exemption as regards its liability under paragraph One (a).
The company clearly and definitely agrees to pay "to any
person entitled thereto under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law . . . the entire amount of any sum due," and as
held by the Court in Landry v. Shinner,33 compensation, plus
a fifty per centum increase is payable under the Work-
men's Compensation Act for injuries sustained by an illegal-
ly employed minor.
The court held in the Landry v. Shinner case that al-
though the hiring of a minor in violation of the Child Labor
Act was an illegal contract, yet such contract was not abso-
lutely void; that it had sufficient virility to fix the relation
of Master and Servant.
It seems the court, quite logically, might have reached
a different conclusion. It could be argued that the public
policy of this state as regards child labor was fixed and
established many years before the enactment of the Work-
men's Compensation Act. The Child Labor Act "was mani-
festly intended to prohibit the employment of a child between
fourteen and sixteen years of age at work which it was physi-
cally unable to do and made the certificate of employment
the only evidence of the child's ability to do the work."3 To
hold-and the court had to find-that the illegal contract of
employment was a "contract of hire" within the meaning
of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, does not
seem to tend to discourage the illegal employment of chil-
88 344 IM. 579, 176 N.E. 895 (1931).
34 Gill v. Boston Store of Chicago, 337 Ii. 70, 168 N.E. 895 (1929).
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dren. s5 However, the court definitely did hold in the Landry
v. Shinner case that the illegally employed minor was en-
titled to the benefits as provided in paragraph (k) of Section
8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The provisions of the insurance carrier's agreement in
paragraph (a) of the standard policy to pay "to any person
entitled thereto" the compensation as provided by the pro-
visions of the Act are so explicit and unqualified and are
without any exception or exemption as to illegality of em-
ployment so that the insurance carrier's direct liability
under its policy as regards compensation payable under all
of the provisions of the Compensation Act, the fifty per cen-
tum increase as provided by paragraph (k) of Section 8, as
well as the increase provided by paragraph (i) of Section 7,
in case of the death of the illegally employed minor, appears
to be self-evident.
If the present standard policy made an exception as to
illegally employed minors an entirely different situation
would be presented. In Maryland Casualty Company v. State
Industrial Accident Commission," an exception reading,
"This policy shall cover such injuries . . . sustained by an
85 In Lincoln et al. v. National Tube Co., 268 Pa. 504, 112 A. 73 (1920), the
court stated (p. 73): "Certain clauses in it furnish opportunity for a plausible
argument to the contrary; but in terms it relates only to those employers who
'shall by agreement, either expressed or implied. . . . accept the provisions'
thereof. Since no legal contract could be made by or for the minor to do this
kind of work, and as such a contract could not be legally 'renewed or extended
by mutual consent, expressed or implied,' it is clear the Workmen's Compensation
Law does not cover the case; and this conclusion is rendered still further
necessary by the fact that the two statutes were adopted at the same session
of the Legislature, and, if possible, each must be given funl effect without one
infringing upon the domain of the other. . . . Our conclusion as above operates
so to do.
"Moreover, it cannot be supposed the Legislature intended to make such con-
tracts illegal, and at the same time to give them all the force and effect of legal
contracts, so far as civil liability for injuries to minors is concerned. To so hold
would tend to encourage and not discourage the practice which the statute has
declared illegal; for, in the event of an injury, the employer would suffer no
more in the case of an illegal than of a legal employment.
"In New Jersey and Iowa the same conclusion is reached on substantially
similar provisions (Hetzel v. Wasson Piston Ring Co., 89 N.J. Law 201, 98 A.
306, L.R.A. 1917D 75; Secklich v. Harris-Emery Co., 184 Iowa 1025, 169 N.W. 325),
the statutes in the other states whose opinions are cited or quoted by counsel
being so widely variant from ours as to make their decisions valueless as prece-
dents here, though, partially from a different standpoint, they are in accord with
the conclusion reached by us."
36 209 Cal. 394, 287 P. 468 (1930).
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employee or employees legally employed .. ." was held
valid even though the policy specifically covered the em-
ployer's liability under the California Compensation Act and
the Compensation Act in defining the term employee includ-
ed minors "whether lawfully or unlawfully employed."37 In
a later California case" injuries to night club hostesses
employed in violation of law were held covered by a com-
pensation policy of which the court stated "there was noth-
ing in the insurance contract which purported to limit the
coverage."
Just as a matter of interest and in contrast to the Calif or-
nia court's decision in the night club hostess case, the courts
of New York39 and New Jersey ° have held injuries to bar-
tenders sustained during the prohibition era were not com-
pensable under workmen's compensation acts for the reason
that their contract of employment required them to do acts
constituting violations on their part of the express provisions
of penal statutes, whereas only the employer violated a penal
statute in the night club hostess case, which violation con-
sisted of employing them in violation of the penal code.4
In concluding this phase of the discussion-the liability
of the insurance carrier under the standard policy for com-
pensation for injuries to illegally employed minors-the
seemingly inescapable conclusion that the carrier is liable
both for the regular compensation benefits, plus the fifty per
centum increase, is all the more apparent by the provisions
of Condition D of the policy that "the obligations of para-
graph One (a) . . .are declared to be the direct obligations
37 Workmen's Compensation Act of California, § 8 (a) (St. 1917, p. 835).
"Thus the policy is intended to cover all employees of the insured except those
specifically excluded in the policy, towit, those illegally employed. We can find
no ambiguity in the policy." Maryland Casualty Co. v. State Ind. Acc. Com.,
supra n. 36, 287 P. at p. 469.
38 Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 19 Cal. App. (2d)
583, 65 P. (2d) 1349 (1937).
39 Herbold v. Neff, 193 N.Y.S. 244 (1922); Swihura v. Horowitz, 212 N.Y.S. 926
(1925).
40 Snyder v. Morgan, 9 N.J. Misc. 293, 154 A. 525 (1931).
41 Section 303 of the Penal Code provided that it should be unlawful "to
employ upon the premises where the alcoholic beverages are sold any person
for the purpose of procuring or encouraging the purchase or sale of such
beverages, or to pay any person a percentage or commission on the sale of
such beverages for procuring or encouraging such purchase or sale."
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and promises of the company to any injured employee cov-
ered hereby ... " In fact, very careful analysis of the
terms and provisions of the policy fails to disclose any ex-
pressed intention on the part of the company to make any
exception of liability under the Workmen's Compensation
Act in regard to illegally employed minors.42
IS THE INSURANCE CARRIER LIABLE WHERE THE ILLEGALLY
EMPLOYED MINOR SUES AT COMMON LAW?
Having considered the liability of the insurance carrier
under paragraph One (a) of the Standard Workmen's Com-
pensation and Employers' Liability Policy as regards com-
pensation benefits payable to an illegally employed minor,
there remains the, even more important question of the in-
surance carrier's liability in cases where the illegally em-
ployed minor files with the Industrial Commission a rejec-
tion of his right to benefits and pursues his common-law
remedy to recover damages for such injury. 43
It may be said in passing that the legislature by the
1931 Amendment to Section 6 gives to the illegally employed
minors greater rights than are possessed by either legally
employed minors or adults in that the former can choose be-
tween two remedies-the acceptance of benefits under the
Act or suing at common law.
We now consider the common-law action. Is the insur-
ance carrier under the standard policy liable to indemnify
the employer against the expenses of trial and the amount
of any judgment which might be recovered by the illegally
employed minor in a common-law action against the employ-
er in a case where the minor previously had filed with the
42 In Ide v. Faul & Timmins, 166 N.Y.S. 858 (1917), the court stated (p. 861)
"Unquestionably as the appellants contend, the parties to an ordinary contract
of indemnity may limit the insurer's liability and exempt the insurer from any
claim for indemnity to the insured against damages resulting from the violation
by the insured of the Labor Law. Mason-Henry Press v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 211
N.Y. 489, 105 N.E. 826.
"In the case at bar no limitation of the contract of insurance in the respect
suggested has been made and the same is clear and free of all ambiguity."
4.3 As previously pointed out by the provisions of the 1931 Amendment to Sec-
tion 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the illegally employed minor can
file a rejection of his rights under the Act and sue at common law.
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Industrial Commission a rejection of his right to compen-
sation?
Clearly and definitely the provisions of paragraph One
(a) of the policy would have no application to such common
law suit for the reason they deal solely with the employer's
liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act. We turn,
therefore, to the provisions of paragraph One (b). Under this
paragraph the insurance company agrees "to indemnify the
employer against loss by reason of the liability imposed upon
him by law for damages on account of such injuries to such
of said employees as are legally employed whenever such
injuries may be sustained within the territorial limits of the
United States of America or the Dominion of Canada .
It will at once be noted that the insurance carrier's lia-
bility under the provisions of paragraph One (b) is express-
ly limited to "such of said employees as are legally em-
ployed."
The liability of the insurance carrier under paragraph
One (b) of the present standard policy, therefore, is very
similar to that which existed under the old employer's in-
demnity policies prior to the enactment of Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts.
In regard to provisions in such policies excepting lia-
bility in cases of illegally employed minors, the general rule
was that such exceptions were valid.
In the majority of cases it seems to be held that any illegality or viola-
tion of law in the employment of a minor has effect to release the insurer
from his liability under a provision in the employee's indemnity policy
of insurance excepting liability in case of a person employed contrary to
law as to age, or illegally employed, regardless of whether the violation
was a material one or not.44
The restriction in the present standard policy of the
insurance carrier's liability under paragraph One (b) to
"such of said employees as are legally employed" is clear-
ly valid and binding upon the parties in accordance with the
overwhelming weight of authority. 45 In Mason-Henry Press
44 59 A.L.R. 301.
45 Goodwillie et al. v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 108 Wis. 207, 84 N.W.
164 (1900); Kleeman Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 177 Mo. App. 397, 164
S.W. 167 (1914); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tyler Box & Lumber Mfg. Co., 149 S.W.
283 (Tex. Civ. App., 1912); Buffalo Steel Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 136 N.Y.S.
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v. Aetna Life Insurance Company,"1 in which case the policy
did not cover "loss or expense arising on account of, or re-
sulting from injuries or death to, or if caused by any person
employed in violation of law, the New York court stated
(p. 827):
The parties, by their contract of indemnity or insurance had a right to
place a limitation on the insurer's liability, and to exempt the latter from
any claim for indemnity to the insured against damages resulting from
the latter's violation of the Labor Law. They did not insert in the contract
a clause thus limiting the liability of the insurer.
In Zisko v. Travelers Insurance Company,47 the illegally
employed minor recovered a judgment against the employ-
er who in turn sued the insurance carrier. The New Jersey
court stated (p. 391):
An infant illegally employed has a common law cause of action
against his employer to recover for the injury sustained. . . . The
defendant did not insure this risk, but did insure the liability of the
employer to pay compensation to such employees as were legally em-
ployed and who met with accidents arising out of and in the course of their
employment. To deny such carrier the rights arising from a disclaimer,
such as was proved here, would result in the imposition of a liability not
arising in the contract of the parties and completely at variance with
their understanding. Such is not the law.
Without such exception in paragraph One (b) in the
standard policy, the insurance carrier would be liable to
indemnify the employer in cases where the illegally em-
ployed minor sued at common law. However, such excep-
tion is clearly expressed in paragraph One (b) and, there-
fore, the insurance carrier is not liable.4 8
977 (1912); United Waste Mfg. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 148 N.Y.S. 852
(1914). Contrast Edward Stern & Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 269 Pa. 559, 112
A. 865 (1921), where the insurer was held liable on the policy to the employer
for injuries sustained by an illegally employed minor, where clause (b) of the
policy did not exclude persons illegally employed. The court held that enforce-
ment of the policy was not contrary to public policy. For an interesting case in-
volving clause (b) of the Standard Workmen's Compensation policy see Blanke-
Baer Extract & P. Co. v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 96 S.W. (2d) 648 (Mo.
App., 1936), where the minor originally was illegally employed but became of
legal working age during the policy period and her injuries sustained after be-
coming of legal working age were held covered by clause One (b) of the Standard
Workmen's Compensation & Employers' Liability Policy.
46 211 N.Y. 489, 105 N.E. 826 (1914).
47 117 N.J.L. 366, 189 A. 389 (1937).
48 "... . The majority of courts apparently are of the opinion that any illegality
or violation of law in the employment of a minor effects a release of the insurer
from his liability under a provision in an employer's indemnity policy of insur-
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In concluding on the point of the insurance carrier's lia-
bility as to injuries sustained by illegally employed minors
under the present standard policy, it is submitted that the
insurance carrier is liable for compensation benefits, includ-
ing the fifty per centum increase in cases where the ille-
gally employed minor elects to proceed under the provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. On the other hand, it
is submitted that when the illegally employed minor or his
legal representative files with the Industrial Commission a
rejection of his right to the benefits under the Compensation
Act and elects to pursue his common-law or statutory rem-
edy to recover damages, the insurance carrier is not liable
under the standard policy to indemnify the employer either
for expenses incurred in the defense of such action or for
any judgment which might be obtained.
In conclusion, the urgent need for legislative action to
clarify the Illinois situation is clearly indicated. The present
complex situation is unfair to employers, insurance car-
riers and to employees. The measure and the time limitation
of liability is uncertain as regards both the employer and
the insurance carrier. Only the legislature can provide the
remedy. Other states have found legislative action neces-
sary to correct more or less similarly confused situations,
and in this connection and without in anyway endorsing
either plan, attention is called to the action of the Wisconsin
and New York legislatures 9 which might well be found help-
ful in evolving amendments suitable to conditions and which
would clarify the presently confused situation in Illinois.
ance excepting liability in case of a person employed contrary to law as to age
or illegally employed, regardless of whether the violation was material or
not...." Couch, Insurance, § 1278, p. 4701.
49 Wisconsin Statutes, § 102.62. The employer is made primarily liable and the
insurance carrier is secondarily liable for the increased compensation payable
under the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act to minors who are employed
in violation of the Child Labor Act.
New York Statutes, Ch. 67, § 142. The employer only is liable for the
increased compensation payable to illegally employed minors; the insurance
carrier is liable only for the regular amount of compensation.
